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Randall W. Eberts and Stephen A. Wandner

Responding to the Needs
of Workers during the
Great Recession
D

uring the Great Recession
of 2007–2009, the number of
unemployed seeking assistance from
the public workforce system more
than doubled from prerecession levels.
The unprecedented number of public
workforce participants tested the
capacity of the system to serve their
needs. Before the recession, the federal
workforce programs had been funded
at fairly constant levels, and there
appeared to be little excess capacity in
the programs to accommodate a sizable

The majority of ARRA funds
were spent long before the
number of workforce system
participants peaked.
influx of participants. This article
examines the response of the three major
public workforce programs and the
Unemployment Insurance (UI) system
in meeting the needs of workers during
and immediately following the recent
recession. It summarizes the findings
of one chapter of a much larger study
supported by and prepared for the U.S.
Department of Labor (Eberts, Wandner,
and Cai 2012).
To help meet the challenges of a
deepening recession, Congress passed the
American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) in the first quarter of 2009,

a year after the recession began. The bill
appropriated more than $800 billion to be
used over a two-year period from 2009Q2
through 2011Q2 to help stimulate the
economy and provide funding to support
essential services. The U.S. Department
of Labor received roughly $66 billion,
of which $45 billion supported and
expanded the UI system by extending
benefits and modernizing the system. The
three federal workforce programs that
provide most of the job search assistance
and training services—the Workforce
Investment Act Adult and Dislocated
Worker programs and the Wagner-Peyser
Employment Service (ES)—received
$2.1 billion, about 75 percent of the
PY2009 appropriations for the three
programs.
Even with these additional funds, the
question facing the public workforce
system was how fast and effectively
could it use these funds, along with the
regular annual appropriations, to respond
to the needs of the influx of unemployed
workers? A complicating factor was the
partnership among the federal, state, and
local entities in providing these services,
since it is the local entities that actually
spend the funds to provide job search
assistance and training services. The
U.S. Department of Labor issued several
directives to states and local Workforce
Investment Boards to encourage them to
spend the money as quickly as possible
and to focus on training services to
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The Need
Soon after the economy began to slip
into a recession at the end of 2007, the
number of unemployed rose dramatically.
Within four quarters, the number of
workers who lost their jobs climbed 7.7
million in 2008Q1 to 12.8 million in
2009Q1—a 66 percent increase. By the
end of 2009, unemployment peaked at
15.2 million, or 10.0 percent of the labor
force, more than double the number
before the recession began.
As the number of unemployed
escalated, the major public workforce
programs quickly became inundated
with people seeking short-term income
support, job search assistance, and
training. The first line of support for the
unemployed is typically the UI system.
The number filing for UI benefits (initial
claims) surged from 4.9 million a quarter
in 2008Q1 to 8.5 million a quarter in
2009Q1—a 73 percent increase within
the first year of the recession (Figure
1). All three workforce programs
experienced large jumps in the number
of participants, but the influx into these
programs did not start until later. By
2010Q1, the number of ES participants
increased 45 percent, WIA Adult
participants jumped 102 percent, and
WIA Dislocated Worker participants
surged 188 percent. During that quarter,
ES served 4.9 million participants,
WIA Adult served 560,000, and WIA
Dislocated Worker served 410,000. In
total, the three programs were serving
2 million more customers during that
quarter than they were two years prior to
that time.
The Response
The three programs offering job
search assistance and training made
relatively quick use of the supplemental
funds from ARRA. The ES spent the
ARRA funds the fastest, with 85 percent
of the available funds expended in the
first five quarters. If the funds were spent
evenly over the nine quarters, 55 percent
of the funds would be expended during
the first five quarters. The WIA Adult
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Figure 1 Percentage Change in the Number of Participants of the ES, WIA Adult,
WIA Dislocated Worker (DW) Programs, and the Number of UI Initial
Claims (IC) from 2008Q1
300
Percentage difference from 2008Q1

the extent financially feasible (U.S.
Department of Labor 2009).
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program spent 72 percent of its available
supplemental funds the first five quarters,
and the WIA Dislocated Worker program
spent 60 percent.
However, the level of funding was
not enough to match the influx of
participants. For example, while total

The ability to expand capacity
to provide the additional
services speaks well of the
responsiveness of the workforce
system, as evidenced by the
sheer numbers served.
expenditures for the WIA Adult program
grew 30 percent from the prerecession
period to the ARRA funding period, that
increase was eclipsed by the 157 percent
increase in the number of participants
during that same period (Table 1).
Thus, expenditures per participant fell

by 49 percent. The WIA Dislocated
Worker program experienced the same
percentage decline in expenditures per
participant. The ES program saw a 30
percent decline in the funds available
per participant. Furthermore, the timing
of the expenditure of funds was out of
sync with the increase in participants.
As shown in Figure 1, the number of
participants in the three programs did
not peak until 2011Q2, even though a
majority of the funds were spent before
2009Q3. Therefore, in addition to fewer
funds per participants overall, the desire
to spend the ARRA money as quickly
as possible left even fewer resources for
those who entered the programs at a later
date.
The bunching of expenditures in the
first half of the ARRA funding period is
evident in the timing of the provision of
services. Three types of WIA services are
tracked over time:

Table 1 Percentage Changes in Number of Participants and Expenditures from the
Prerecession Period to the Recovery Act Period, by Program
Percent change from prerecession period
to Recovery Act period
Participants
Expenditures with Recovery Act funds
Average expenditure/participant with
Recovery Act funds

ES
58.9
11.2
−30.0

Program
WIA Adult
156.7
30.3
−49.3

WIA DW
183.5
40.7
−50.3

Note: Percentage changes are calculated between the time periods 2005Q3–2007Q4 and
2009Q2–2011Q2, based on quarterly averages within each period.
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example, the number of days between
the time a person registered for the WIA
Dislocated Worker program and the time
he or she first received training services
increased dramatically, from 54 days in
2007Q3 to 95 days in 2008Q3.
The WIA Adult program exhibited a
similar pattern. From 2008Q3 through
2009Q3, the number receiving intensive
services grew from 103,000 to 156,000,
those receiving training jumped from
37,000 to 60,000, and those receiving
supportive services increased from
23,000 to 33,000. Similar to the
availability of WIA Dislocated Worker
services, the surge in WIA Adult services
lasted only a few quarters. The increase
in waiting time for services was also
similar, increasing by 35 days between
2007Q3 and 2008Q3.
The Effect
The number of WIA program
participants who found employment
immediately after exiting the programs
steadily increased throughout the ARRA
funding period. From 2009Q1 through
2010Q3, the number of WIA Adult
exiters who found employment increased

from 107,000 in 2008Q3 to 159,000
in 2010Q3, an increase of 50 percent.
The WIA Dislocated Worker program
registered even larger percentage gains:
exiters who found employment grew
from 45,000 to 106,000, an increase of
135 percent. These increases stand in
sharp contrast to the national trends in
hiring and job creation. Nationwide, the
number of hires declined by 2.8 percent
and the number of private sector jobs
fell by 2.2 percent during that period.
However, much of the increase in job
placement can be attributed to the greater
number of people in the program. When
looking at the rate of employment
(exiters finding work divided by the total
number of exiters), the rate for WIA
Adult exiters stayed roughly the same,
as the number of exiters rose at about the
same rate as those employed. However,
the employment rate for WIA Dislocated
Worker customers fell, as the number
of exiters outpaced those finding work
(Figure 2).
Summary
The analysis suggests that the U.S.
workforce system responded to the needs

Figure 2 Number of Employed and Entered Employment Rate of Those Leaving
the WIA Dislocated Worker Program
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1) Intensive services, which include
staff-assisted job search assistance,
such as comprehensive reemployment
assessments, development of individual
employment plans, and counseling and
career planning.
2) Training services, such as
occupational training and basic skills
training.
3) Supportive services, which offer
transportation, child care, housing, and
needs-related payments to those who
need assistance in order to participate in
the programs.
Not tracked in this study are core
services, which are typically self-assisted
services with little staff intervention. For
both the WIA Adult and WIA Dislocated
Worker programs, a higher percentage
of participants received the higher-cost
intensive and training services once
the ARRA funding became available
than was the case before the recession.
However, this increase was short lived.
By 2010Q2, the percentages had returned
to their prerecession levels and after that
time fell even lower.
The ability to expand capacity to
provide the additional services speaks
well of the responsiveness of the
workforce system, as illustrated by the
sheer numbers served. The number of
WIA Dislocated Worker customers
receiving intensive services increased
from 46,000 in 2008Q3 to 114,000
in 2009Q3. During that same time
period, the number receiving training
increased from 21,000 to 56,000, and
those receiving supportive services grew
from 12,500 to 26,000. However, the
heightened service receipt lasted only
one quarter before starting to decline.
By the following quarter, service receipt
among the three types of services fell by
as much as 30 percent and continued to
decline throughout the remainder of the
ARRA funding period. For example, the
percentage of entrants receiving highcost training services reached 30 percent
as ARRA funding became available in
the middle of 2009, but within a year
the percentage fell back to 10 percent.
Furthermore, as the influx of participants
taxed the system’s capacity to provide
services, customers had to wait longer
before they received services. For
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of workers during the recent recession,
but the resources available, even with
the ARRA funding, were insufficient
to provide the same level of services
throughout the two-year ARRA funding
period that the system provided before
the recession. Calculations, described
in the larger study, estimate that an
additional $8.5 billion, on top of the
$2.03 billion appropriated under ARRA,
would have been needed to provide
prerecession-level services to the influx
of participants into the three programs.
A conscious decision was made to
spend money on passive policies, such
as extending UI benefits, instead of
providing additional dollars for more
active policies, such as job search
assistance and training. Furthermore,
the desire to spend the ARRA funds as
quickly as possible left fewer resources
available later on when the largest
numbers of participants were still in
the programs. Nonetheless, the system
exhibited a capacity to expand services,
albeit for a short period of time, and to
help people get back to work.
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Burt S. Barnow, John Trutko, and Jaclyn Schede Piatak

How Do We Know
Occupational Labor
Shortages Exist?
T

he term labor shortage has no
universally agreed upon definition. It
sometimes refers to a shortfall in the total
number of individuals in the labor force,
and sometimes denotes the possible
mismatch between workers and jobs in
the economy. In our recently published
book, Occupational Labor Shortages:
Concepts, Causes, Consequences,
and Cures, we define an occupational
labor shortage as a sustained market
disequilibrium between supply and
demand in which the quantity of workers
demanded exceeds the supply available
and willing to work at the prevailing
wage and working conditions at a
particular place and point in time. (Please
see www.upjohn.org/Publications/Titles/
OccupationalLaborShortages for more
information about the book.) In general,
the quantity of labor that workers are
willing to provide is an increasing
function of the wages (i.e., price) they
can obtain, and the relationship between
wages and the amount that workers are
willing to provide at various prices, with
other factors held constant, is referred to
as the labor supply curve.
Figure 1 shows a typical upwardsloping supply curve for labor. As the
wage rate is increased, more workers are
willing to enter a particular occupation,
and current workers are generally willing
to provide more labor. In Figure 1, the
amount of labor that employers wish to
hire at alternative prices is indicated by
the downward-sloping demand curve.
The point labeled E in Figure 1 is the
market equilibrium point. If the wage is
equal to WE , then the quantity of labor
that workers are willing to supply at that
wage (QE) is exactly equal to the quantity
of labor that employers will wish to hire.
The market is in equilibrium because
the quantity supplied is equal to the

quantity demanded. If, for some reason,
the prevailing wage rate in the market is
W0 rather than WE, then the quantity of
labor that workers are willing to supply
is equal to QS—the point on the supply
curve corresponding to W0. Employers,
however, would like to hire QD at that
wage rate. The difference between the
amount of labor that employers wish
to hire and the amount that workers
are willing to provide (QD − QS) is the
amount of the shortage.
Unfortunately, identifying a shortage
is not easy. Just as the concept of “full
employment” does not mean zero
unemployment, a labor market is likely
to have some vacancies in equilibrium;
thus, the question is: When are there

How long must a market have
excess vacancies before it is
considered to have a shortage?
excess vacancies that signify a shortage?
Likewise, markets do not adjust
instantaneously to shocks, so how long
must a market have excess vacancies
before it is considered to have a shortage?
Drawing the line between a shortage
and a tight labor market is not easy.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not
publish data on vacancies by occupation,
so even if there was agreement on what
constitutes a shortage, the data needed to
identify shortages do not exist.
Economists and other analysts have
proposed alternative definitions of
occupational shortages. Early studies
by Arrow and Capron (1959) and Blank
and Stigler (1957) defined shortages
as situations where demand for labor
increases faster than supply can grow—a
condition sometimes observed in the
market for engineers during economic
booms. Although rapid increases in

